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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. 
Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay 
is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be 
optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our 
mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User 
entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is 
designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so 
the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of “cµ-rule”. Social warfare or revenue maximizing by 
appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditional applications, such as web browsing, file transfer, remote terminal and electronic mail, etc, do not impose 
severe requirements on the network. They can tolerate relatively large packet delays. New Internet applications, such as 
real-time applications such as interactive voice and video are more delay-sensitive. Heterogeneity of the delay 
requirements makes it necessary that different users are handled differently. The emergence of time-critical applications 
on the Internet is one of the primary reasons for customer-oriented service differentiation. On the other hand in order to 
survive in the highly competitive Internet services market, the network service providers will have to provide 
customized network services. Internet is becoming more and more a multi-service network. Clearly, any successful 
solution to supporting multiple services cannot rely on technical solutions only but also has to take into account the 
economic aspects. Corresponding to the best effort service, today the most common charging method in Internet is 
based on the flat-rate model. Given the differentiation of network services, the flat-rate pricing model which is 
commonly applied to charge users for the access service to the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will become 
inadequate. Without an appropriate pricing scheme, any service differentiation is useless. If there were no price 
difference between the priority classes, all users would prefer the best one.[1][2] 
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Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. When 
a capacity-constrained network service provider faces delay sensitive customers, delay is a key dimension of network 
service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should be optimally allocated. Pricing can play an 
important role in the allocation of service capacity and the appropriate determination of priority [3]. Many studies of 
price and service differentiation in priority queueing systems analyze the centralized pricing, where the provider sets an 
incentive compatible price-service menu for finite classes of users. But in settings with many or continuum customers 
whose delay sensitivities are not known to the provider, it may be beneficial to use auctions, where the provider 
allocates priorities and charges corresponding payments based on customers’ bids [4].  
In this paper, we consider a priority queueing system with many infinitesimal users. The main QoS parameter that users 
care about is delay.  Assume there is a continuous distribution of users’ delay cost per unit time. We analyze the 
allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our model, the stochastically arriving users are 
privately informed about their own marginal costs of delay which is observed neither by the provider nor by the other 
customers, and arriving customers cannot observe the system state. Arriving users can decide not to enter the network at 
all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. When a user enters the network, he obtains priority over all users 
(waiting in the queue or arriving while he is waiting) who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which 
is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. 
Consider the participation constraint, under some conditions users with the highest delay cost values will decide not to 
enter the network, because the service value is not enough to cover its total cost. For the users entering the network, we 
know that it is optimal (minimizing the total delay cost per unite time of users) to schedule them by the so called “cµ-
rule” which provides a higher priority to those users who have a higher marginal delay cost. This rule is implemented by 
the payment function which is proved to be incentive compatible: users entering the network will submit their true delay 
sensitive values. So a user with higher marginal cost submits a higher bid, and higher priority services are allocated to 
the users who are more sensitive to delay. As a result the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of 
“cµ-rule”. When allow the network imposing a uniform reverse payment on users who enter the network, Social warfare 
or revenue maximizing can be realized by appropriately setting the reserve payment. 
A number of authors have addressed related issues. Auction motivates lots of research interest in network resources 
allocation and congestion pricing, and several schemes were proposed such as Smart-market Pricing [5], Progressive 
Second Price auction (PSP) [6] and Smart Pay Admission Control (SPAC) [7] mechanism. But these schemes mainly 
focus on the allocation of limited network resource to users not the priority in which agents’ jobs are processed. 
Mendelson and Whang [3] analyze the M/M/1 non-preemptive priority queue with multiple user classes, deriving an 
incentive compatible priority pricing scheme. Mandjes [1] analyzes the incentive compatible problem of data users and 
voice users in computer network when network provides a service with only two priorities. Kleinrock [8] was the first 
one to study the allocation of priorities based on payments, he derived steady-state expected waiting times (which 
depend on the bribes) and studied the resulting queue discipline for various payment functions. Liu [9] revisits 
Kleinrock’s model, but assumes that customers make payments in order to minimize its total cost; he derives a bidding 
equilibrium, and shows that a higher marginal cost leads to a higher bid. Afèche and Mendelson [4] analyze the priority 
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auctions with a generalized delay cost structure. Kittsteiner and Moldovan [10] analyze the bidding strategy that 
depends on processing time. Our analysis is mainly based on Liu’ work, in our model the user’ bid behavior is 
simplified: users only need to decide whether to enter the network and announce their delay values if entering, the 
payment calculation is left to the network, and we focus on the optimal setting of reserve payments to maximize the 
social warfare or revenue, while Liu are more care about optimally setting service speed.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the basic model of the priority services, a 
payment function is given and proved to be incentive compatible. In section 3 we consider incentive compatible 
payment function when a reverse payment is allowed. We analyze how users entering the network can be regulated by 
reverse payment, and we analyze the problem of social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the 
reserve payment. Finally, in Section 4, we conclude the paper with a summary.  
 
2. THE BASIC MODEL 
 
We consider a capacity-constrained network service provider, modeled as an M/M/1 queueing system that serves users 
with differential delay sensitivities. The network service provider distributes a network service which has constant value 
V. Service time obeys an exponential distribution with unit mean. Users which are infinitesimal relative to the market 
size arrive according to a Poisson process. λ is assumed to be the mean arrival rate or market size of users which 
arrive at the network according to a Poisson process.  
Users differ in their delay sensitivities c, the marginal delay cost per unit time. Assume that there is a cumulative 
distribution of delay sensitivities represented by A(c), c∈ [0, cmax]. It’s assumed that A(c) is common knowledge, and is 
continuously differentiable. 
The provider allocates priorities of queues via a simple direct-revelation bidding mechanism. When a user comes to the 
queue he can choose either of two strategies: (1) not to enter the queue at all or (2) submit an announced delay sensitive 
value cˆ   and pay a charge which is decided by a payment function p( cˆ ) (non-revisable and non-refundable) to the 
network. A user who submits cˆ  gets priority over all those with strictly lower values c′ˆ < cˆ , and equal bidders are 
served FIFO. Suppose c ≤cmax is the maximization delay value of users who choose to enter the queue. Following Naor 
[11], the utility of a user with true (marginal delay cost) value c, announced value cˆ  and experiences a delay w is: 
))ˆ(()ˆ,( cwcpVccU +−=      (1) 
From [8] and [9], when users are ranked by their true delay sensitive values (when each user announces cˆ =c in our 
model), the aggregate delay cost of users entering the queue is minimized, and the mean delay of user with delay value c 
is given by 
2))()(1(
1)(
cAcA
cw λλ +−= .     (2) 
Proposition 1. Under above assumptions, the bidding mechanism is incentive compatible and quasi-optimal when the 
payment function is given by 
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Proof: From (3) we have 
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From (2), )ˆ(cw′  <0, when cˆ >c, )ˆ(cU ′  <0, while when cˆ <c, )ˆ(cU ′  >0, so when cˆ =c, user obtains maximizing 
utility. So users bidding strategies is incentive compatible: 
)ˆ,(),( ccUccU ≥ , ∀ cˆ >0. 
Because users bidding strategies is incentive compatible, and users are ranked by the announcing values, the aggregate 
delay cost of users entering the queue is minimized by the bidding mechanism. Thus the mechanism is quasi-optimal. 
This completes the proof. 
Now the utility of a user with delay value c in the incentive compatible mechanism is:  
))()(()( ccwcpVcU +−=      (4) 
Besides incentive compatible attribute, participation constrain is also important for mechanism design. Because the 
bidding mechanism is incentive compatible, we have 
)(
)()()(
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From (2) w(c)>0 , we have U’(c)<0 , so U(c) is a strictly decreasing function over [0, cmax], we have mentioned that 
c ≤cmax is the maximizing value of users who choose to enter the queue. Assume  c&  is the unique solution of 
0))()(( =+− ccwcpV . 
c&  is determined by the mean arrival rate λ and cumulative distribution of c. and we have c = min (cmax, c& ). The 
participation constrain of the bidding mechanism is c≤c . Users with true value c≤c  enter the queue and announce 
cˆ =c, while other users choose not to enter the queue. Thus all users will get nonnegative expected utility. 
By (3), we know that the marginal increase of the payment of a user (with value c) is equal to the resulting decrease of 
his delay cost -cw’(c). Each user’s payment equals his priority externality, the marginal net value losses he inflicts on all 
lower-priority customers. So the intuition behind the payment function is an exclusion compensation principle. A user 
with higher delay sensitivity will submit higher delay sensitive value, and will be scheduled by a higher priority, so 
more users’ mean delay will be inflicted by his enter; as a result he should be charged a higher payment. This pricing 
principal is analogous to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which is widely used in the allocation of 
interdependent resources. 
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3. OPTIMIZATION OF SETTING RESERVE PAYMENT   
 
In the basic model of section 2, marginal delay value of users entering the network is determined by the mean arrival 
rate λ and cumulative distribution of c. A user with unit delay value c=0 will not be charged any payment. Now we 
assume that the network imposes a uniform reverse payment p  on all users who enter the network (Auction model of 
section 2, can be treated as a special case with p =0). As same as section2, when a user comes to the network he can 
decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value cˆ  and pay a charge which is 
decided by a payment function p( cˆ ). Users are also ranked by their announced delay sensitive value. 
Proposition 2. When a reverse payment is charged, the bidding mechanism is incentive compatible and quasi-optimal 
when the payment function is given by 
pdxxwxcp
c
+′−=
∫
ˆ
0
)()ˆ( .     (5) 
Prove of Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1, we omit it here. 
Consider the participation constrain U( c& )=0, and c = min (cmax, c& ). Now network service provider can regulate the 
marginal delay value of users by the choice of variable p . When network services provider sets a higher reverse 
payment, marginal delay value will be also higher. So a higher reverse payment leads to fewer users entering the 
network. On the contrary lower reverse payment leads to more users entering the network. Network service provider can 
optimally set the reverse payment to maximize the revenue or the social warfare.  
To simple the analyzing of optimal problems of revenue maximizing or social warfare maximizing, we should get more 
explicit expression of w(c), p(c), and c . We assume c follows a uninformed distribution over [0, cmax]: 
],0[,)( maxccAccA ∈=       (6) 
So Acmax=1. And from (2) we have 
2)1(
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From (5) we have 
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For c= c , we have 
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For c < cmax, U( c )=0, so 
cVcp −=)(  
From the last two equations we have: 
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)(1 pVA
pV
c
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−
= λ       (9) 
It can be see that marginal delay value of users entering the network is determined by the mean arrival rate λ and 
cumulative distribution A, and the reserve payment p . When λ and A are fixed, from (9) c  is a decreasing function 
of p . The reverse function of (9) is given by 
cA
cVcp λ−−= 1)( .       (10) 
Define the minimizing value of p  as 
min
p  at which exactly all users enter the network. When p >
min
p only some 
users enter the network. By substituting c =cmax and Acmax=1 to (10) we have 
λ−−= 1
max
min
cVp .         
Considering the constraint p ≥0, so when 
min
p <0 and p >0 or when 
min
p >0 and p >
min
p , c  is determined by 
(9). While when 
min
p >0 and 0≤ p ≤
min
p , c =cmax. 
 
3.1 Revenue maximization 
 
Revenue of network service provider consists of the payments obtained from those users who enter the network: 
dccApc
∫
=Π
0
)(λ .      (11) 
When 
min
p <0 and 0≤ p ≤V, c  is determined by (9), together with (8) we can derive the expression of Π  as a 
function of p . 
A
pVA
pVA
pVAp
pVp λ
λ
λ
λ ))(1ln(2
)(1
))(1()( −+−
−+
−+
+−=Π   (12) 
From (12) we can derive the first-order and second-order derivatives of )( pΠ : 
2))(1(
)2()(
pVA
pVA
p
−+
−
=Π′ λ
λ
     (13) 
3))(1(
)1(2)(
pVA
pAA
p
−+
+−
=Π ′′
λ
λλ
     (14) 
Because )( pΠ ′′ <0 so Π  is a strictly concave function of p . And by first order condition )( pΠ′ =0, the network 
service provider gets a maximum when he sets p =V/2. 
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When 
min
p >0, the curve of )( pΠ  have two sections: 0≤ p ≤
min
p and 
min
p < p ≤V. When 0≤ p ≤
min
p , from (8), 
(11) , c =cma and Acmax=1, we obtain 
pcccp λλ
λ
λ +
−
++
−
=Π )1ln(2
1
)( maxmaxmax     15) 
From (15), we can derive the first-order of )( pΠ : 
λ=Π′ )( p  
So when 0≤ p ≤
min
p , revenue of network service provider can be increased by raising p  till it reach 
min
p . While 
when 
min
p < p ≤V the expression of Π  is given by (12) as same as the situation of 
min
p <0 and 0< p <V. 
From(15),(12), Π  is a linear function over 0≤ p ≤
min
p  , a concave function over 
min
p ≤ p ≤V, and Π  is 
continuous at 
min
p . So when 
min
p ≤V/2, the network service provider gets a maximum when he sets p =V/2, while 
when 
min
p >V/2 the network service provider gets a maximum when he sets p =
min
p . 
 
3.2 Social warfare maximization 
 
Social warfare consists of the aggregate net value of users who enter the network. 
AdcccwVc
∫
−=Γ
0
))((λ      (16) 
By substituting (7) to (16) we can derive the expression of Γ  as a function of c . 
A
cA
cVcAc λ
λλ )1ln()( −++=Γ      (17) 
From (12) we can derive the first-order and second-order derivatives of Γ : 
cA
AVc λλ −−+=Γ
′
1
11)(      (18) 
2)1()( cA
A
c λ
λ
−
−
=Γ′′       (19) 
From (19), we have )(cΓ ′′ <0, Γ  is a strictly concave function of c . 
Consider the situation: 
min
p <0 and 0≤ p ≤V. From (9) we obtain the value of c  corresponding to p =0  
AV
V
c λ+= 1
0
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From (18), we have 0)0( >=Γ′ AVλ . So the maximum of )(cΓ  may obtain at *c =min( 0c  , 1c ), where 1c  is 
obtained by the first-order condition. And from (10) we can obtain the corresponding reserve payment maximizing the 
social warfare. 
Consider the situation of 
min
p >0, the maximum of )(cΓ  also obtain at c*=min(cmax, 1c ). When *c = cmax the 
corresponding reserve payment could be any value between [0, 
min
p ], while when *c = 1c  we can obtain the 
corresponding reserve payment maximizing the social warfare from (10). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. 
We solve the problem of how to allocate priorities in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our model, arriving 
users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. A user obtains priority 
over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion 
compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior 
leads to the implementation of “cµ-rule”. Social optimization or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the 
reserve payment is also analyzed. 
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